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THE PIKETTY PHENOMENON: WHY HAS 
CAPITAL BECOME A PUBLISHING SENSATION? 
 
Robert H. Wade 
 
Two gentlemen relax in mahogany-panelled clubland. One says to the other, 
looking up from his newspaper, “The poor are getting poorer, but with the rich 
getting richer it all averages out in the long run” (New Yorker cartoon,   
Mirachi 1988).  
 
Thomas Piketty’s book Capital in the Twenty First 
Century was published in its English translation in March  
2014. As of  April and May 2014  the book  hit number one 
on Amazon’s best-seller list (including fiction), beating out 
Lynn Vincent’s Heaven is for Real: A Little Boy’s 
Astounding Story of His Trip to Heaven and Back, and 
Erlend Blake’s Never Work Again: Work Less, Earn More 
and Live Your Freedom.  BookData reports that UK sales 
in the eight weeks following late April were 14,445. The 
Economists’ Bookshop, next to the London School of 
Economics, says it has never sold so many non-fiction 
hardbacks in the first months of publication. The nearest 
competitor is Steven Hawkings’ A Brief History of Time, 
from 1988.  Yet Piketty’s is no bedside reading: its 685 
pages weigh 1.1 kilos, qualifying it for dual use in 
universities and gyms. An economist friend who 
mentioned his occupation to his London taxi driver was 
surprised and pleased to be asked whether he had read 
this book by a Frenchman named Piketty. A sure sign of a 
phenomenon. 
 
Its success makes that of the earlier, slimmer (only 
330 page) book about the costs of inequality, Richard 
Wilkinson and Kate Pickett’s  The Spirit Level: Why More 
Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better,  look almost 
modest. The Spirit Level has sold “only” between 250,000 
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and 300,000 copies in 24 languages since publication in 
2009.   The publicity storm around Capital will die down; 
the question is whether the book will remain in the 
pantheon or disappear when – if – robust economic 
growth returns. 
 
How can we explain the book’s astounding success, 
which took the publishers, Harvard University Press, by 
surprise?  One obvious reason is a slew of extravagant 
reviews, some extravagantly favourable, others 
extravagantly hostile. Martin Wolf of the Financial Times, 
one of the most influential economic commentators in the 
(English-language) world, described it as “an 
extraordinarily important book” (2014a).  Paul Krugman, 
Nobel laureate in economics and columnist for the New 
York Times, hailed it as “awesome”, “truly superb”,  “the 
most important book of the year – and maybe of the 
decade” (2014b).  John Cassidy in the New Yorker said, 
“Piketty has written a book that nobody interested in a 
defining issue of our era can afford to ignore” (2014).  
Other reviewers trashed it. Clive Crook’s review on 
BloombergView was titled “The most important book ever 
is all wrong” (2014a). Allister Heath’s in The Telegraph 
described it as “horrendously flawed” (2014). 
 
Why is the book so compelling to reviewers and the 
reading public?  Here I give several reasons.  First, the 
book makes a carefully documented frontal challenge to 
the long-dominant side of the inequality debate, which 
says that inequality is not a problem for public policy 
attention (Wade 2007, 2011). Second, inequality of income 
and wealth had already become a controversial subject, 
especially since the Great Crash of 2008; so the ground for 
the book’s uptake was already prepared. Third, it clarifies,  
objectifies, legitimizes and provides a kind of catharsis for 
middle-class anxieties surging since the Great Crash. 
Finally, the book is in important ways reassuringly 
conventional in its analysis and prescriptions, and so is 
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less threatening to familiar ways of thought. At the end I 
discuss the future of inequality.  
 
The book challenges dominant beliefs about elites and 
inequality  
 
Leading politicians have long extolled inequality. 
Prime Minister Thatcher assured her public, “It is our job 
to glory in inequality and to see that talents and abilities 
are given vent and expression for the benefit of us all”. 
Prime Minister Blair, of the Center-left, told his 
interviewer: “If you end up going after those people who 
are the most wealthy in society, what you actually end up 
doing is in fact not even helping those at the bottom end.”   
 
One of the US’s two main political parties has long 
been committed to defending the interests of the wealthy 
over those of ordinary families. The biggest tax cuts 
presided over by President George W. Bush were on 
income from investments and on heirs to large fortunes: 
the top rate on dividends fell from just under 40% to 15%, 
and the estate tax was eliminated. The Republican tax plan 
during the second Obama administration would enable 
someone living off investment income to pay no federal 
tax at all.  
 
Bernard Arnault, CEO of the French luxury group 
LVMH, said to be the 10th richest person in the world, 
boasted in 2000, “Business, especially international ones, 
have ever greater resources, and in Europe they have 
acquired the ability to compete with states…. Politicians’ 
real impact on the economic life of a country is more and 
more limited. Fortunately” (quoted in Halimi 2013).  
 
 
Most  economists, to the extent they think about 
inequality at all, have argued that inequality-reducing 
policy measures beyond modestly progressive taxes and 
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help for the poor are unnecessary and even harmful to 
social well-being.  “The market” will ensure inequality 
tends to stabilize at a level which appropriately balances 
social costs and social benefits, whatever they may be.  
That level will reflect the necessity of inequality as a source 
of incentives for effort and creativity, from which society 
benefits; and it will respect the freedom of individuals to 
make contracts as they wish (within the law), from which 
society also benefits.   
 
In developed countries, according to this belief, the 
share of labour income has been roughly constant for 
decades; so as economic growth occurs, the earners of 
labor income share proportionately in the gains, together 
with the earners of income from ownership of assets. “A 
rising tide lifts all boats”, and “studying changes in income 
distribution is like watching grass grow”.    
 
In developing countries, the high level of  income and 
wealth concentration seen in countries like China, India,  
Brazil, South Africa --  much higher than in developed 
countries -- will tend to subside “by itself”, through the 
workings of the market, urbanisation and social mobility. 
This is known as the Kuznets argument.    
 
Willem Buiter, former professor of European 
economics at the London School of Economics and 
currently chief economist, Citigroup, expressed the 
prevailing nonchalance when he announced, “Poverty 
bothers me. Inequality does not. I just don’t care” (2007).  
The Nobel Prize economist Robert Lucas was more 
aggressive: “Of the tendencies that are harmful to sound 
economics, the most seductive, and in my opinion, the 
most poisonous, is to focus on questions of distribution” 
(2004).  Earlier the famous neoliberal economist Ludwig 
von Mises declared his love for the anti-egalitarian, anti-
democratic message of Ayn Rand’s  Atlas Shrugged. He 
wrote to Rand in 1958, “You have the courage to tell the 
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masses what no politician told them: you are inferior and 
all the improvements in your conditions which you simply 
take for granted you owe to the efforts of men who are 
better than you” (quoted in Frank, 2012: 147).   
 
Economists and other social scientists tend to study 
“problems”.  Issues not studied tend to be seen as 
“natural”.  “Poverty” and the “poor” are problems, the 
subject of a vast social science literature. Inequality,  
income concentration, the behaviour and influence of the 
super-rich tend to be treated as part of the natural order of 
things, not in need of social science attention. We have a  
“poor economics” but no “rich economics”.   
 
Piketty challenges this corpus of beliefs in an easy-to-
read but authoritatively scientific way. His central point is 
that viewed over centuries income and wealth have tended 
to concentrate in the top few percentiles of the population; 
and there is no self-equilibrating mechanism to reverse the 
trend.  
 
The long term trend has been checked from time to 
time by some combination of (a) wars, depressions, 
hyperinflations,  (b) highly progressive tax rates, and (c)  
high growth of productivity and population. The first two 
have lowered the rate of return on capital ownership; the 
third has raised the rate of economic growth and so raised 
the rate of growth of average incomes.  
 
The middle decades of the twentieth century, from 
the 1930s to the 1970s, were an exceptional period of 
inequality decline in the West, thanks to these forces. But 
in “normal” conditions, including the period since the 
1970s, the tendency to rising inequality re-emerges.   The 
owners of capital (broadly defined, to include land, real 
estate, as well as factories and financial assets) accrue a 
rising share of national income,  the suppliers of “labour” 
accrue a falling share.  Piketty  suggests that many 
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developed economies in the past few decades have been 
moving up towards (but remain some way short of)  levels 
of income and wealth inequality last seen in the early 
twentieth century. He further suggests that the much 
higher levels of inequality in today’s “emerging markets” 
will persist rather than subside unless strong policy 
measures are taken to rein them in or unless they 
experience wars, depressions or hyperinflations. 
 
Moreover, Piketty’s and other data show that income 
and wealth concentration typically increases the higher the 
position in the hierarchy: within the top 1% of the 
population the top 0.1% have a disproportionately large 
share; within the top 0.1% the top 0.01% have a 
disproportionately large share. This pattern fits Zipf’s Law, 
which characterizes not just income distributions but also 
city size distributions, word frequency distributions, and 
more.  
 
Why does income and wealth concentration increase 
the higher towards the top?  One reason is that the rate of 
return on fortunes increases with the size of fortunes. 
Another is inheritance, as fortunes are passed from 
generation to generation -- fortunes not just in material 
assets but also in the self-confidence learned from being 
brought up as a superior in social hierarchies. Piketty 
draws on the novels of Jane Austin and Balzac to show 
how inheritance dominated income distribution – and 
marriage strategies -- in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.  
 
The upshot is that money begets money, and the 
more money there is,  the more begetting ensures 
(Henwood 2014).  In Piketty’s phrase, “The past devours 
the future”. The future may see a return to the 
“patrimonial capitalism” of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, in which income distribution is substantially 
shaped by the distribution of inherited wealth. This is a 
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society at complete variance with understandings of the 
good society shared across most of the western political 
spectrum today. 
 
However, Piketty’s data show that Northwest 
European countries and Japan have experienced much 
less increase in concentration at the top than the US, UK 
and other Anglo countries (together with tiny Iceland: 
Wade and Sigurgeirsdottir, forthcoming). In the former,  
incomes of the middle class and the poor have increased 
faster than in the Anglo countries, while their economies 
grew more or less as fast and levels of material well-being 
for ordinary people kept pace.   
 
 
From this we can conclude, first, that the trend 
towards rising concentration is not quite as hard-wired 
into capitalism as most (but not all) of Piketty’s book says.   
Policies, institutions and politics – which are all 
changeable -- have more of a role in income distribution 
than the more fatalistic passages in the book say. Second, 
more equal economies are not necessarily less dynamic, 
and more unequal economies are not necessarily better at 
raising mass living standards, contrary to mainstream 
thinking.  In other words, Anglo levels of income 
concentration are not necessary for a well-functioning 
society.     
 
That being said, pointing to Europe as a place of 
significantly lower income and wealth concentration than  
the US raises a data problem.  Gabriel Zucman’s new 
research suggests that the fraction of European wealth 
hidden away in tax havens is substantially higher than the 
fraction of American income and wealth, which reflects 
higher rates of tax on top incomes and capital gains in 
Europe and therefore a stronger incentive for 
concealment. So European income and wealth 
concentration may be relatively higher than the tax return 
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data suggests, as compared to the corresponding 
adjustment for  the US.  Zucman finds that the overall 
numbers for income and wealth concealment are huge – 
around 8% of global wealth of households is held in tax 
havens, most of it unrecorded, and most of it owned by 
residents of developed countries, especially Europeans 
(Zucman 2013).    
 
 As Zucman’s findings suggest, one can raise plenty of 
queries (nit-pickettys) about Piketty’s data, especially 
about trends in wealth concentration, which is the most 
original part of the data set.  Indeed, The Financial Times 
launched a frontal assault on Piketty’s main conclusions, 
saying in an editorial that errors and data problems “seem 
to undermine his conclusion that wealth inequality is 
rising in the US and Europe”, “undermine his thesis that 
capitalism has a natural tendency for wealth to become 
ever more concentrated in the hands of the rich”, 
“question his finding that the holding of wealth by the rich 
in Europe has increased since 1980” (Financial Times, 
2014). However, the Financial Times conclusions have 
been substantially rejected by former World Bank 
economist Branko Milanovic, who knows as much about 
the data as anybody and has worked  independently of 
Piketty (Milanovic 2014, 2011). A re-analysis of Piketty 
and the Financial Times comes to conclusions close to 
Piketty’s and far from the Financial Times’.  It turns out 
that the Financial Times did not make allowances for 
several changes in the methodology used to measure 
wealth distribution in Britain over time (related especially 
to the difference between tax return data and household 
income survey data, the latter underestimating income 
and wealth at the top by even more than the tax return 
data). So it took at face value  – without adjusting for the 
methodology changes – that the wealth share of the top 
10% in the UK did fall, in reality, by 12 percentage points 
during the 1970s and by another 11 percentage points in  
2005-06. Piketty made the adjustment for the changes in 
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methodology, and found a much higher wealth share in 
the top 10% (Elliott 2014).  The Financial Times emerges 
with a bloody nose, having also ignored its own coverage 
of other indicators of income and wealth concentration, 
such as soaring prices of high-end real estate, booming 
market for luxury goods, and bubbling market for equities. 
In May 2014 Christie’s contemporary art auction in New 
York returned the world’s highest ever auction total for 
one day: $744mn;  enough to build several schools and 
hospitals (Barker 2014).     
 
Some conservative critics dismiss the future 
relevance of the trends, on two grounds. First,  the current 
intense spurt of technological change (internet, mobile 
telecoms, digital economy) will accelerate economic 
growth in the West to the point where growth stays above 
the rate of return to capital; and this  will drive income 
and wealth concentration down “by itself”. Second, the 
whole world economy will grow faster thanks to 
developments in the “emerging markets”, and this too will 
help to keep the concentration of income and wealth 
down.  The message is,  “this time is (or will be) different” 
(Worstall 2014). We have heard this message during every 
boom, and insistently between 2000 and the Great Crash 
of 2008.   
 
Inequality became a heated topic after 2008 
 
So Piketty’s findings challenge the conventional 
wisdom. But the challenge on its own cannot explain the 
book’s success, because his broad findings are not new. 
Sharp increases in inequality in developed countries since 
the late 1970s, especially in the United States but also in 
other Anglo countries (including New Zealand: 
Rashbrooke 2013), have been well documented by others,   
though less comprehensively and without much data on 
wealth as distinct from income.  They include Larry Mishel 
and co-authors at the Economic Policy Institute in 
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Washington DC, who have documented rising income 
inequality in the US in periodic publications since 1988.  
James K. Galbraith and colleagues at the University of 
Texas, Austin have used data on wages to examine trends 
in distribution since the 1960s, in developed and 
developing countries. Their findings, too, have been 
readily accessible for decades. Likewise  Anthony 
Atkinson’s research at Oxford and Gabriel Palma’s at 
Cambridge. The  popular Nobel Prize-winning economist 
Joseph Stiglitz drew on a lot of existing evidence of fast-
rising inequality for a recent book,  The Price of 
Inequality, published in 2012; but it did not take off  in the 
way that the publicly-unknown – and French, not Anglo -- 
Piketty’s has.  With these and other cases in mind I 
published an essay in 2012 called “Why has income 
inequality remained on the sidelines of public policy for so 
long?” (Wade 2012; also Wade 2014).  
 
Timing matters. Had the book been published before 
2008 it would have been much less successful. So the 
second reason for Capital’s success is that inequality and 
concentration had already become controversial – had 
risen up the public and political attention cycle – by the 
time of its publication in early 2014. Many Americans, 
who used to dismiss concern  about inequality as “the 
politics of envy” -- something that only status-conscious 
Europeans worried about -- were stung by the excesses of 
Wall Street and dismayed that they could no longer 
borrow against rising house prices; and began talking of 
inequality more negatively than for decades.  President 
Obama declared inequality to be “the defining challenge of 
our time” (Obama 2013).  Pope Francis identified it as a 
problem facing the  world, as in his tweet that “inequality 
is the root of social evil” (quoted in Brown 2014). The 
World Economic Forum’s panel of global risk experts 
ranked “severe income disparity” as the second equal 
global risk over the next decade (World Economic Forum 
2012).  The Occupy Protests framed the issue as the “top 
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1% vs. bottom 99%”,  as they occupied key sites in nearly a 
thousand cities in more than 80 countries in 2011-12  
under the banner of “We are the 99%”.   
 
The wealthy hit back, furious at this questioning of  
their role in society as   job creators for the common good, 
innovators for social betterment, and problem-solving 
philanthropists (Konczal 2014). Prominent Wall Streeters 
accused President Obama of  “demonizing” and 
“persecuting” the rich.  Stephen Schwarzman, CEO of 
Blackstone Group (an American multinational private 
equity firm),  declared that proposals to eliminate tax 
loopholes for hedge funds and private equity managers 
were “like when Hitler invaded Poland in 1939”.  Venture 
capitalist Tom Perkins wrote to The Wall Street Journal,  
“I would call attention to the parallels of Nazi Germany to 
its war on its ‘one percent’, namely its Jews, to the 
progressive war on the American one percent, namely the 
‘rich’” (both quotations in Krugman 2014a). A sizable  
section of the American public supported the wealthy in 
their push back, out of anti-government sentiment. The 
Tea Party insurgency – financed largely by billionaires -- 
preached that government measures of progressive 
taxation and social protection undermined the moral 
fabric of society, by enabling some to free-ride on the hard 
work and creativity of others.  By 2010 Friedrich von 
Hayek’s  The Road to Serfdom stood at  241 on the 
Amazon best-sellers list, exceptional for a book first 
published almost 70 years before. It was propelled to these  
heights by conservative media advertising it as a guide to 
what the Obama government was trying to do to America 
through its efforts to reduce the great divides in access to 
health care, health status and life expectancy   (Farrant 
and McPhail 2010).   
 
 
The book clarifies, objectifies and legitimizes middle-class 
anxieties post 2008 
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The third reason for Capital’s success is that it  
objectifies and legitimizes the unease and anxiety that 
have pervaded large swathes of western societies since 
2008.  And crucially, it does so from within a conventional 
capitalist discourse; Piketty is not an outsider, a member 
of a heterodox sect who can easily be dismissed. This is 
similar to what a psychotherapist does – help people to 
recognize that their experiences and feelings are 
legitimate.   
 
One indicator of mood is the Conference Board poll 
which asks respondents whether business conditions are 
good or bad. From January 2008 to May 2014 – 76 
consecutive months -- more people said bad than good. In 
June 2014 the balance changed, but by a margin so tiny it 
could easily be reversed when the final June figure is 
released (Norris 2014).   In Britain the Labour Party since 
2012 has campaigned under the banner of “the cost of 
living crisis”, meaning the long stagnation of middle-class 
incomes,   uncertain career prospects for middle-class 
children, and job growth biased to internships and 
minimum-wage activities (the “precariate”).   
 
The World Economic Forum’s Global Risks 2012 
reports, “On an unprecedented scale around the world, 
there is a sense of receding hope for future prospects.  
Gallup polling data in 2011 reveal that, globally, people 
perceive their living standards to be falling, and they 
express diminishing confidence in the ability of their 
government to reverse this trend. This discontent is 
exacerbated by the starkness of income disparities” (2012: 
18).   
 
Rage against the rich is the other end of the post- 
2008  zeitgeist, fuelled by daily revelations of corporate 
wrongdoing combined with immense personal enrichment 
and immunity from prosecution. The astounding bottom-
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line figure has become well known: in the period 2009 to 
2012, 93% of the increase in US national income accrued 
to the top 1% -- this in a stable democracy rather than a 
kleptocracy like Equatorial Guinea (Klitgaard 1991).  
 
 Anger and anxiety around living conditions feed into  
a concatenation of other sources,  including immigration, 
obesity, failing public health services, failing public 
schools, failed financial re-regulation, unaccountable 
governments, dead-end Congress,  weird weather, climate 
change,  globalization, terrorism, Islamic threat, and 
“rising powers” challenging western hegemony. Every day 
wakes with another intake of news that the fabric of peace 
and hierarchy around the world is fraying.  
 
In the US only 36% of respondents in 2011 said 
economic globalization is a positive development, down 
from 60% in 2001.  A Gallup poll in 2011 asked 
respondents in many countries the question, “Does 
globalization bring more problems than it solves?”.  In 
Western Europe, 59% agreed or agreed strongly; in Asia 
and Pacific, 64% agreed or agreed strongly.  
 
In this context Capital has the appeal of a dystopian 
novel like Nineteen Eighty Four and Brave New World, by 
indicating the destination we are headed for if we do not 
change now.  In that future the wealthy lift off from the 
rest of society and perpetuate their wealth from generation 
to generation like the nobility of former eras.  Capitalism 
mutates into “patrimonial capitalism”; democracy mutates 
into “plutocratic democracy”.   
 
Then, having painted a dystopian future, the book 
ends with catharsis: an escape route to a more fair and 
stable world.  The trend of rising concentration at the top 
is not destiny; it can be changed by political choices,  short 
of wars, depressions, and Apocalypse. The past need not 
devour the future. 
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Piketty’s main proposal – a global wealth tax – is 
easily dismissed as utopian.   The Economist rejects it with 
“Mr Piketty’s focus on soaking the rich smacks of socialist 
ideology, not scholarship” (Economist 2014). But it is not 
as utopian as might be thought at first glance.  The US 
government taxes citizens wherever they live and work in 
the world. In recent years the government has  elicited 
“cooperation” (with the help of thumbscrews) from several 
key foreign jurisdictions, notably Switzerland, to comply 
with US standards and hand over bank details of American 
citizens. A global wealth tax could build on this 
cooperation (Crook 2014b). A necessary condition is a 
global registry of wealth similar to land registries, which 
countries have had for centuries. Recording who owns the 
world’s equities and bonds would make tax evasion a lot 
more difficult (Zucman 2013). 
 
Also, national governments could feasibly  do more to 
tax wealth than at present without waiting for 
international cooperation across tax jurisdictions --  and 
then cut income tax or value-added tax (Morgan and 
Guthrie  2011).  For example, the UK tax system presently 
encourages people to own big houses, because high value 
houses are taxed (by Council Tax) much less as a 
proportion of their market price than cheap ones (Dixon 
2014). It would be quite feasible for the government to 
levy a flat percent of the price of the house; or at least 
place an extra levy on Council Tax for houses owned by 
“non-doms” who live in the UK but are not domiciled for 
tax purposes. The property taxes on the $20 million 
London house of New York City’s former mayor, Michael 
Bloomberg, are a mere $3,430 a year.  The government 
should also place an extra levy on empty properties, which 
currently enjoy a Council Tax discount. The latter is 
particularly egregious, because – in wealthier parts of 
London – houses and apartments have become a place for 
the world’s super-rich to park their money at an annual 
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rate of return of 10 percent, rather than a place to live.  
The minimal tax paid by those treating real estate like a 
global reserve currency gets reflected in failing public 
services, including a school capacity shortfall in London 
projected to be 90,000 places by 2015 (Goldfarb 2013).  
 
However, the focus on wealth distribution does miss 
an important point.  If we take Piketty’s figures at face 
value and put aside Zucman’s evidence on income and 
wealth concealment, then only about a third of the income 
of the top 1% (in US) is capital income; two thirds is 
“labor” income – eg super-salaries and super-bonuses. 
Trends in market income distribution (before tax) are  
driven more by the determinants of labor income 
distribution than wealth distribution, so far. Remedies for 
soaring income concentration have to tackle labor income 
concentration, which is not directly hit by wealth taxes.   
 
The book remains reassuringly conventional 
 
 
A fourth reason for the book’s success is that its basic 
“lens” or paradigm is reassuringly conventional. If the 
book had been called Capitalism in the Twenty First 
Century it would have been less successful, for   
“capitalism” easily links to Marx while “capital” is a word 
in everyday and generally positive use.  Even so, when a 
top-level executive of Deutsche Bank in London entered 
the office of a researcher and spotted Capital, he spat out, 
“Regurgitated Marxism!”, leaving the researcher 
convinced he should not be seen around Deutsche with the 
book in hand (personal communication, June 2014).  
 
It is conventional in two basic ways.  First, like 
neoclassical economics in general, it concentrates on 
income and wealth distribution and says little about 
production – about the structure of power relations in the 
world of employment, notably between the owners and 
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managers of capital and the rest. But one does not have to 
be a Marxist to see that these power relations in 
production are a prime cause of pre-tax income 
distribution. Second, to the limited extent that Piketty 
tries to explain income and wealth distribution he uses a  
fairly standard neoclassical marginal productivity 
explanation for distribution below the top one percent 
(and a power-based “grab everything  you can” 
explanation for the latter).  Thomas Palley comments, 
“That [the mostly neoclassical framing] creates a 
gattopardo opportunity whereby inequality is folded back 
into mainstream economic theory which remains 
unchanged" (2014). Gattopardo refers to the famous line 
in The Leopard, “For things to remain the same, 
everything must change”.   
 
 Piketty’s re-distribution policy solutions – including 
a wealth tax -- are also of a comfortingly conventional 
neoclassical kind (though they call for a much stronger 
redistribution of market income than has been achieved 
through current rates of tax progressivity, wage subsidies 
and social assistance). Had Piketty emphasised “pre-
distribution” – changes in institutions and policies to 
make pre-tax income distribution less unequal, including 
in corporate governance law and trade union law -- he 
would have been seen as more radical, more threatening, 
more marginal (Baker, 2011).    
 
The future of inequality 
 
It is striking that in the course of more than 600 
pages Piketty devoted almost no attention to why 
inequality matters. That would mean asking  questions 
like: when (using what criteria and evidence) are the rich 
too rich, and when do the social costs of reducing their 
share outweigh likely social benefits?  
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For reasons suggested earlier, these have been largely 
taboo topics. But very recently researchers in the 
International Monetary Fund – a pillar of global 
orthodoxy – have published findings about the 
macroeconomic costs of inequality (Ostry et al. 2014), 
findings which Martin Wolf of the Financial Times 
describes as “strikingly clear” (2014b). First,  countries 
with higher inequality tend to experience lower and more 
volatile growth; countries with lower inequality tend to 
experience higher and less volatile growth, other things 
being equal.  Second, there is little if any trade-off between 
redistribution and growth; so the growth costs of 
redistribution measures (like higher taxes) are typically 
less than the growth benefits of lower inequality.   
 
The implication of the IMF’s and other evidence is 
that current levels of inequality in the Anglo countries 
make it difficult to achieve adequate economic growth 
with financial stability (unless by the unsustainable 
German route of repressed wages plus large export 
surpluses).  High and rising income concentration 
generates savings glut at the top and underconsumption 
lower down. Governments are constantly tempted to 
engineer credit and asset booms. So credit remains too 
cheap and debt remains too high, and central banks 
become  reluctant to damage the debt-heavy economy by 
tightening monetary policy. Meanwhile fiscal tightening is 
hobbled by political paralysis. When the boom turns to 
bust,  governments and central banks are aggressive in 
trying to ease the ensuing hangover with loose monetary 
policy. But the bust is likely to usher in a “balance sheet 
recession”, as in Japan through the 1990s and  2000s and 
much of the West since 2008.  Balance sheet recessions 
are very difficult to escape from, because the chief 
objective of households and corporations becomes to pay 
down debt; so private demand shrinks and monetary 
policy becomes ineffective. It can take years for the 
deleveraging process to be complete enough for economic 
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growth to resume without riding on the back of more 
borrowing and still more financial instability. As The 
Financial Times’ Wolfgang Munchau says about Europe 
gripped by a balance sheet recession (which very low 
interest rates have not cured), “The most likely trajectory 
is a long period of slow growth, low inflation, and a 
constant threat of insolvency and political insurrection” 
(2014:13).   
 
 
 As well as the economic costs we also have the 
evidence on social and health costs analysed in Wilkinson 
and Pickett’s The Spirit Level (2009). As for political 
costs, American political scientists have found a startlingly 
high degree of “representational bias” or “representational 
inequality” in recent US politics. Martin Gilens 
summarizes: “Under most circumstances, the preferences 
of the vast majority of Americans appear to have 
essentially no impact on which policies the government 
does or doesn’t adopt” (2012:1). More specifically, when 
the preferences of the wealthy differ from those of the 
general public (on economic, financial, social welfare 
issues), public policy reflects the preferences of the 
wealthy, except in rare moments of radical social 
movements, such as the two “big bangs” of US social 
welfare policy in the 1930s and 1960s. Research across 
European countries also finds a high degree of 
representational bias in favour of the wealthy. But it is 
typically less than in America, the difference reflecting 
more public financing for candidates, parties and media in 
Europe and therefore somewhat lower dependence on 
private donors (Rosset et al. 2011; Mandle 2004).   
 
On both sides of the Atlantic we seem to be caught in 
a vicious circle, such that economic inequality generates  
political inequality of party and governmental 
responsiveness, leading to policies which favour the 
wealthy and disfavour poorer citizens, most of the time 
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(Bartels 2008; Hager 2009).  Long ago Louis Brandeis 
(justice of the US Supreme Court from 1916 to 1939) 
expressed the same insight:  “We must make our choice. 
We may have democracy, or we may have wealth 
concentrated in the hands of a few, but we can’t have 
both.”   
 
 The effect is to reinforce institutional arrangements 
which keep sluicing pre-tax incomes  upwards, often by 
enabling interlocking elites to create self-serving 
arrangements for themselves. Think of the elite networks 
of Wall Street, Washington, big agriculture, big energy, big 
universities (Brooks 2014; Wedel 2009).  
 
Moreover, these privilege-protecting networks extend 
well beyond national boundaries, and coordinate national 
politics to advance transnational elite interests in high 
profits and low taxes. The “mega-regional” trade deal 
currently under negotiation called the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is a case in point. 
Corporations on both sides of the Atlantic, including 
European giants like Siemens and France’s Veolia,  are 
pressing for new privileges to take direct action against 
states that dare to threaten their profits by protecting 
employment, the environment and health rights. The deal 
is intended to strengthen the ratchet under corporate 
profits; to boost western business’ “ability to compete with 
states” and limit “politicians’ real impact on the economic 
life of a country”, to use Bernard Arnault’s approving 
words.   
 
Another part of the same syndrome of political effects  
is that tax avoidance and wealth concealment have become 
socially quite acceptable in elite circles. Very rich people at 
London dinner parties boast that they pay virtually no tax 
anywhere; and tax lawyers at London dinner parties boast 
that they can ensure this result with no risk of penalties 
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(personal communications, June 2014). They are entirely 
untroubled by the social implications of their actions.  
 
 
 For all the recent national and global attention to 
inequality (Obama’s “the defining challenge of our time”), 
the chances that something  significant will be done to 
curb it are not high.  The policies and institutions of the 
post-war decades which helped to drive inequality down – 
including high upper-bracket tax rates, laws protecting 
trade union bargaining power, financial sector constraints,  
capital controls  -- could not have happened without elites 
being deeply fearful of mass unrest, based on fresh 
memories of the Depression and war, strong trade unions, 
and the Soviet Union providing an apparently plausible 
alternative to capitalism. As these fears waned, higher 
capital mobility generated competition between 
jurisdictions to offer favourable conditions, including 
“light touch” regulation, anti-union laws, pro-CEO-
remuneration laws, and lower income and inheritance 
taxes.    
 
 To the extent that western elites after the 1970s 
referred to inequality as a problem, they domesticated it as 
“poverty”; reducing inequality meant reducing poverty. 
The middle-class professionals who staff the 
commentariate, the higher offices of state and the agenda-
setting organizations like the OECD, the IMF and the 
World Bank are comfortable talking about helping “the  
poor”, “the other”; and all the major religions, as well as 
secular humanist philosophy, enjoin help for “the 
(deserving) poor”. Compressing the whole income 
distribution cuts much closer to home. We are anxious 
that inequality could point to people like us as part of the 
problem rather than the solution. We are anxious that 
reducing inequality might mean taxing us and lifting up 
those not far below us in the hierarchy, reducing the gap – 
threatening our  status.  
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 This helps to explain why centre-left parties made a 
tactical choice not to emphasise the dangers of rising 
inequality. In the words of Roger Liddle, one of the 
principal strategists of the British New Labour Party,  
 
“In the mid-1990s, the leaders of New Labour made a fundamental 
policy choice. In government [they had been out of government 
since 1979] they would not explicitly prioritise a lessening of 
inequalities between top and bottom. Instead their social justice 
priorities would be to tackle poverty, worklessness and economic 
and social exclusion. 
 
Several reasons were clearly important in Labour making this 
choice…. [First, a sense] that intellectually Thatcherite 
neoliberalism was triumphant, and that the post-war welfare state 
consensus had irretrievable broken down and could only be rebuilt 
on a basis that incentivised (and did not penalise) hard work at all 
levels of society.   
 
[Second], New Labour … seized on the discourse of globalisation to 
provide a deeper intellectual rationale…. New Labour portrayed 
globalisation as an inexorable force of nature beyond political 
control – making irrelevant old egalitarian and interventionist 
social democratic responses and requiring a thorough rethink of 
the means of achieving social justice, if not a redefinition of its 
goals” (2007: 2).       
 
 But it was not just a matter of tactics.  Leading 
centre-left figures really did believe in a moral society 
similar to that of conservatives:  one in which, to quote 
two British theorists of the “Third Way”,  “the key to 
justice as fairness can be seen in terms of the procedural 
securing of opportunities rather than a substantive 
commitment to patterned relative outcomes”  (Buckler 
and Dolowitz, 2000, emphasis added). 
 
 Another leading intellectual on the British centre-left, 
Will Hutton, likewise defines “fairness” as rewarding 
individuals in proportion to the amount of discretionary 
effort they deploy to achieve socially useful results, 
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provided they actually achieve them. The aim of a centre-
left government should be to make access to riches 
dependent on “talent, effort and virtue”, as distinct from 
making outcomes more equal (Hutton 2010).   
 
 For all that it has been vital to the center-left’s 
defence for ignoring inequality of outcomes, the 
distinction between achieving more equality of 
opportunity and more equality of outcomes falls down at 
the first nudge.  Children of wealthy parents have far wider 
market opportunities than children of poor or middle-
class parents, through multiple channels (Summers  2014; 
Boucher 2013).     
 
All governments, including democracies, tend to fail 
in response to problems which have the clear potential of 
becoming catastrophes at some point beyond the next 
election. The stuttering responses to climate change and   
human and animal resistance to antibiotics are cases in 
point. So too is the response to rising inequality.  
 
 The key lesson from Piketty’s book is that, at present 
and likely future levels of income and wealth 
concentration, capitalism is losing its core claim to 
legitimacy, namely, that it incentivizes hard work and 
entrepreneurialism while it provides a floor of social 
protection to those towards the bottom end of the income 
scale.  To generate the necessary political will in favour of 
curbing inequality we must re-frame the very way we 
discuss the role of state and market. Prevailing narratives 
use “deregulation” to mean more free market and 
“regulation” to mean more state.  Even people on the Left 
use this framing, as in “We need regulation to curb the 
dangers of free markets”.  In fact, the issue is not 
regulation or deregulation, because there is no such thing 
as a free or unfettered market. The issue is whether to 
regulate market society in line with broadly shared social 
values or regulate market society in line with the 
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preferences of the wealthy sliver.  Talk of “deregulation” is 
a smoke-screen; it conceals state actions (policies and 
institutions of the “pre-distribution” kind) which directly 
and indirectly drive money up.  Not just the Left but also  
conservatives of the “one-nation” kind should be able to 
agree on this reframing.   END 
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